Prevalence-induced Concept Change in Older Adults by Devine, Sean
Prevalence-Induced  Concept  Change  in  Older  Adults 
 
 






  A  Thesis 







  Presented  in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the  Requirements  
For  the  Degree  of  Master  of  Arts  (Experimental  Psychology)  at  
Concordia  University  















May  2020 





CONCORDIA  UNIVERSITY  
School  of  Graduate  Studies 
 
This  is  to  certify  that  the  thesis  prepared 
 
By:   Sean  Devine  
Entitled:   Prevalence-Induced  Concept  Change  in  Older  Adults  
 
and  submitted  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of 
 
Master  of  Arts  (Experimental  Psychology) 
 
complies  with  the  regulations  of  the  University  and  meets  the  accepted  standards  with  respect  to 
originality  and  quality. 
 
Signed  by  the  final  Examining  Committee: 
 
                                     Andreas  Arvanitogiannis                               Chair 
Chair’s  name 
 
                                           Roberto  de  Almeida                                 Examiner 
Examiner’s  name 
 
                                            Karen  Li                                  Examiner 
Examiner’s  name 
 
                                            Ben  Eppinger                                  Supervisor 
Supervisor’s  name 
 
Approved  by  ________________________________________________________ 
Chair  of  Department  or  Graduate  Program  Director 
(Aaron  Johnson) 
 
_______________  2020 ________________________________________________ 
Dean  of  Faculty 
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Sean  Devine  
Concordia  University,  2020  
 
Prevalence-induced  concept  change  describes  a  cognitive  phenomenon  whereby 
judgements  about  concepts  shift  as  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  of  that  concept  changes.  For 
instance,  in  a  task  where  people  have  to  judge  whether  the  colour  of  an  ambiguously-coloured 
dot  is  blue  or  purple,  if  the  frequency  of  objectively  blue  dots  in  the  environment  decreases, 
people  judge  more  dots  to  be  blue  than  they  did  initially.  While  this  phenomenon  has  been 
explored  in  young  adults,  it  is  unclear  how  it  affects  older  adults.  Past  work  suggests  that  older 
adults  simultaneously  rely  less  on  internal  representations,  but  that  they  also  tend  to  perseverate 
more  on  cognitive  tasks.  Thus,  the  question  arises:  Do  older  adults  outsource  control  and  their 
decisions  become  more  susceptible  to  change  or  are  they  more  rigid  in  their  judgements  than 
younger  and  resistant  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change?  
In  the  current  study,  we  explore  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change  affects  older 
adults’  lower-level,  perceptual,  and  higher-order,  ethical,  decision-making.  We  find  that  older 
adults  are  less  sensitive  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults  across  both 
domains.  An  exploratory  analysis  is  conducted  on  response  times  to  help  elucidate  the 
mechanism(s)  underlying  these  differences.  These  analyses  demonstrate  that  older  adults  respond 
more  slowly  than  younger  adults  in  both  tasks.  We  offer  two  interpretations  of  this  finding,  both 
with  implications  for  prevalence-induced  concept  change  research  more  broadly:  general  slowing 
and/or  a  speed-accuracy  trade-off.  Overall,  our  results  suggest  that  older  adults’  judgements 
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“ The  more  things  change,  the  more  they  stay  the  same. ”  
 —  Jean-Baptiste  Alphonse  Karr  and,  later,  Jon  Bon  Jovi 
 
Similarly  to  most  Western  countries,  by  2068,  almost  30%  of  the  Canadian  population 
will  be  65  years  or  older  (Statistics  Canada,  2019).  This  increase  is  accompanied  by  a  parallel 
decrease  of  working-age  people  to  near  60%  of  the  population.  Together,  these  demographic 
changes  attest  to  the  fact  that  older  adults  are  slated  to  take  on  an  important  role  in  shaping 
Canadian  society.  As  baby-boomers  age,  their  judgements  and  decisions  about  the  world  will 
affect  society  more  than  ever  before  and  largely  influence  the  future  direction  of  our  country.  As 
such,  it  is  critical  to  explore  the  cognitive  mechanisms  that  underlie  these  decisions,  such  that  we 
might  gain  a  better  understanding  of  how  older  adults  come  to  make  such  important  decisions 
and,  in  turn,  how  we  might  improve  overall  decision-making  as  we  age. 
The  focus  of  this  thesis  will  be  one  such  cognitive  mechanism:  the  use  of  concepts.  In 
order  to  understand  the  world,  we  must  all  make  judgements  about  concepts.  These  judgements 
range  from  basic  perceptual  ones,  such  as  if  a  banana  is  sufficiently  ripe  to  eat,  to  more  abstract 
judgements  about  the  world,  such  as  whether  some  actions  are  morally  right  or  wrong.  It  has 
long  been  known  that  both  high  and  low-level  judgements  like  this  play  an  important  role  in  how 
we  relate  to  the  physical  world.  Even  prior  to  the  establishment  of  psychology  as  a  science, 
philosopher  Immanuel  Kant  stated  that  “intuition  and  concepts  constitute  [...]  the  elements  of  all 
our  cognition”  (Kant,  1998).  Importantly,  however,  what  we  judge  is  not  always  fixed;  our 
judgements  have  to  be  applied  to  a  changing  world.  For  instance,  when  deciding  to  buy  a  banana 
or  not,  we  must  judge  the  ripeness  of  many  different  batches  of  bananas  that  vary  in  quality  when 
we  visit  the  supermarket.  When  we  do  so,  we  are  faced  with  a  dilemma:  apply  a  fixed  criterion  to 
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changing  exemplars,  such  that  we  decide  not  to  buy  any  banana  at  all  if  none  are  sufficiently 
ripe,  or  adjust  our  criterion  to  what  is  available,  buying  a  banana  we  did  not  before  deem  ripe. 
Similarly,  when  judging  the  morality  of  a  new  law,  we  must  decide  whether  to  apply  a  fixed 
judgement  of  “rightness”  or  to  adapt  to  changing  circumstances.  
  In  a  recent  paper,  Levari  and  colleagues  (2018)  explored  how  we  make  judgements  in  a 
changing  world  in  such  a  way.  In  a  phenomenon  that  they  termed  prevalence-induced  concept 
change ,  they  found  that  as  the  numbers  of  exemplars  of  a  given  concept  increase  in  the 
environment  (e.g.,  more  ripe  bananas),  our  judgements  about  that  concept  (“ripe”  vs.  “unripe”) 
change  such  as  to  include  exemplars  that  they  would  otherwise  exclude.  For  example,  the  authors 
used  a  task  where  participants  (young  adults)  had  to  serially  judge  whether  individual  dots  that 
vary  on  a  spectrum  between  blue  and  purple  were  in  fact  blue  or  purple  (The  Dots  Task;  see 
Figure  1).  When  the  relative  frequency  of  objectively  coloured  dots  in  the  environment  were 
equal  and  consistent  across  this  task  (50%  blue  dots,  50%  purple  dots),  peoples’  judgements 
were  relatively  stable:  If  they  judged  a  dot  to  be  blue  in  the  first  trials,  they  judged  the  same  dot 
to  be  blue  in  the  last  trials.  However,  if  the  number  of  blue  dots  in  the  environment  decreased 
over  the  task  (50%  blue  dots  in  the  first  trials,  but  gradually  shifted  to  4%  blue  dots  in  the  last 
trials),  participants  were  more  likely  to  judge  purple  dots  as  blue  by  the  end  of  the  experiment. 
Put  simply,  when  the  prevalence  of  blue  dots  in  the  environment  changed,  the  boundary  for  what 
counted  as  “blue”  expanded.  Thus,  as  the  authors  claim,  the  concept  itself  changed;  hence, 




Figure  1 .  From  Levari  et  al.  (2018,  Supplemental).  Coloured  dots  in  their  experiments  comprised 
100  dots  ranging  from  approximately  RGB  100-0-155  (very  purple)  to  RGB  0-0-255  (very  blue). 
Each  dot  was  presented  one  at  a  time  and  participants  had  to  judge  whether  a  given  dot  was  blue 
or  purple.  
 
Critically,  Levari  et  al.  (2018)  claimed  that  this  change  did  not  only  occur  for  lower-level 
perceptual  phenomena  like  colour  perception,  but  that  it  indeed  also  arose  in  higher-order 
cognitive  judgements.  In  Study  6  of  their  paper,  they  showed  that  the  same  principle  applied  to 
judgements  about  the  threateningness  of  faces.  As  the  prevalence  of  threatening  faces  in  the 
environment  decreased,  people  were  more  likely  to  judge  non-threatening  faces  as  threatening, 
compared  to  when  the  prevalence  did  not  change.  Similarly,  in  Study  7,  they  showed  that 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  also  occurred  in  ethical  judgements.  Here,  participants  took 
on  the  role  of  a  member  of  an  internal  review  board  and  had  to  judge  a  series  of  research 
proposals  to  determine  if  they  were  ethical  or  not.  Again,  as  the  number  of  ethical  proposals  in 
the  environment  decreased,  people  became  more  likely  to  judge  a  research  proposal  as  unethical 
than  when  the  prevalence  remained  stable.  
The  purported  implications  of  these  findings  may  be  substantial.  Not  only  do  Levari  et  al. 
(2018)  suggest  that  concepts,  once  formed,  are  not  stable,  but  that  they  are  subject  to  continuous 
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update  based  on  information  from  one’s  environment.  Furthermore,  they  claim  that 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  offers  a  cognitive  explanation  to  broader  social  phenomena 
where  this  shift  is  suspected  to  take  place,  such  as  why  people  continue  to  view  the  world  as  a 
dangerous  place,  despite  empirical  evidence  suggesting  just  the  opposite  (Levari  et  al.,  2018). 
  While  this  research  was  the  first  to  give  a  name  to  this  phenomenon,  it  is  not  without  its 
criticism  (see  Discussion  for  more  detail).  One  limitation  to  Levari  et  al.  (2018)  work  that  the 
current  thesis  will  focus  on  is  its  use  of  a  homogenous  group  of  participants,  namely  young 
adults.  While  young  adults  are  a  common  population  to  sample  from,  there  are  both  intuitive  and 
theoretical  reasons  to  be  interested  in  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change  affects 
judgements  in  older  adults.  Firstly,  as  mentioned  above,  older  adults  are  quickly  becoming  main 
decision-makers  in  Canadian  society.  If  prevalence-induced  concept  change  does  generalise  to 
broader  social  decision-making—as  it  does  to  facial  and  ethical  judgements—it  would  be 
important  to  understand  how  it  might  differentially  affect  the  judgements  and  decisions  of  a 
segment  of  the  population  that  has  a  substantial  amount  of  decision-making  power  in  society  and 
stands  to  gain  even  more.  Second,  prevalence-induced  concept  change  is  assumed  to  take  place 
over  long  periods  of  time,  during  which  individuals  can  observe  changes  in  the  prevalence  of 
exemplars  and  adjust  their  judgements  accordingly.  Thus,  in  real-life,  those  who  are  most  likely 
to  experience  the  brunt  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change  are  older  adults  who  have  been 
alive  long  enough  to  see  varying  prevalences  of  exemplars  in  the  environment  and,  as  a  result, 
adjust  their  judgements  over  time.  In  this  sense,  it  is  of  obvious  ecological  interest  to  explore 
how  older  adults  might  be  affected  by  this  phenomenon.  
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From  a  theoretical  perspective,  there  are  also  compelling  reasons  to  think  that  older  adults 
differ  cognitively  from  younger  adults  in  terms  of  how  they  make  judgements  and  decisions.  For 
instance,  there  is  well-documented  evidence  that  older  adults  differ  in  terms  of  their  ability  to 
process  information  and  make  decisions  based  on  this  processed  information  (Murman,  2015). 
These  differences  are  in  part  due  to  cognitive  changes  in  executive  function  (Mayr,  Spieler,  & 
Kliegl,  200),  memory  (Lezak,  Howieson,  Bigler,  &  Tranel,  2012),  and  processing  speed 
(Kerchner  et  al.,  2012)  that  occur  naturally  in  healthy  ageing.  Older  adults  also  differ  in  terms  of 
higher-order  decision-making  strategies,  such  as  motivation,  postponement  of  gratification,  and 
to  what  degree  they  value  desired  outcomes  (Sparrow  &  Spaniol,  2016;  Eppinger,  Nystrom,  & 
Cohen,  2012).  Some  of  these  decision-making  trends  are  hypothesised  to  be  linked  to  a  broader 
decline  in  fluid  intelligence  associated  with  older  age,  which  may  negatively  affect 
decision-making  that  depends  on  the  learning  and  updating  of  new  information  (Samanez-Larkin 
&  Knutson,  2015;  Sparrow  &  Spaniol,  2016).  In  one  case,  these  cognitive  differences  might  be 
protective  against  prevalence-induced  concept  change,  whereas,  in  the  other,  they  may  increase 
its  effects.  Thus,  in  this  thesis,  we  put  forward  the  following  two,  opposing,  hypotheses:  
 
H1:  Older  adults  are  less  sensitive  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults  
H2:  Older  adults  are  more  sensitive  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults  
 
In  the  case  of  H1,  beyond  the  general  deficits  in  learning  mentioned  above,  previous 
work  suggests  that  older  adults  have  specific  difficulty  learning  from  uncertain  outcomes 
compared  to  younger  adults  (Nassar  et  al.,  2016).  In  computerised  tasks,  this  difficulty  manifests 
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as  perseverative  behaviour,  whereby  older  adults  have  a  tendency  to  repeat  previous  responses 
despite  changes  in  the  environment  (Bruckner  et  al.,  in  prep;  Eppinger,  Walter,  Heekeren,  &  Li, 
2013).  This  perseveration  is  an  indication  that  older  adults  are  less  likely  than  younger  adults  to 
update  predictions  about  the  environment,  even  when  doing  so  would  be  advantageous  (i.e.,  it 
would  be  more  rewarding,  as  in  the  studies  cited  above).  In  terms  of  prevalence-induced  concept 
change,  perseverative  behaviour  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  behaviour  that  would  lead  to  a  change 
in  judgements  over  time.  That  is,  repetition  of  past  choices  makes  it  less  likely  that  a  rarer 
category  will  be  chosen  after  a  shift  in  prevalence.  For  example,  if  the  Dots  Task  mentioned 
above  begins  with  an  even  split  between  blue  and  purple  dots,  and  if  the  participant  demonstrates 
perseverative  behaviour,  they  are  more  likely  to  stick  to  their  original  choices  than  be  swayed  by 
the  later  change  in  the  relative  frequency  of  purple  dots  and  blue  dots.  Indeed,  this  is  exactly 
what  Wilson  (2018)  found  when  he  computationally  modeled  prevalence-induced  concept 
change,  using  Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  data.  In  this  paper,  Wilson  (2018)  argued  that 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  was  the  outcome  of  a  sequential  decision-making  process, 
whereby  participants’  choices  were  in  large  part  governed  by  the  set  of  past  stimuli  they 
observed  and  the  past  choices  they  made.  Here,  a  higher  influence  of  past  choice  (a  greater 
weight  on  the  past  choice  parameter  in  the  model)  on  current  behaviour  drove 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  down.  Thus,  older  adults’  tendency  to  perseverate—to  be 
more  consistent  in  their  choices—may  reduce  the  effects  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change 
on  their  judgements  (H1).  
In  the  case  of  H2,  results  from  several  recent  studies  suggest  that  older  adults  may  be  less 
able  to  converge  on  an  accurate  representation  of  the  current  state,  particularly  if  these  states  are 
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latent  (not  directly  observable)  and  need  to  be  inferred  from  experience  (Hämmerer  et  al.,  2019; 
Hämmerer,  Müller,  &  Li,  2014;  Eppinger,  Heekeren,  &  Li,  2015).  To  help  compensate  for  this 
difficulty  in  distinguishing  task  states,  older  adults  preferentially  outsource  control  to  the 
environment  rather  than  rely  on  (sometimes  inaccurate)  representations  (Mayr,  Spieler,  & 
Hutcheon,  2015;  Spieler,  Mayr,  &  LaGrone,  2006).  As  Lindenberger  and  Mayr  (2014)  point  out, 
such  environmental  outsourcing  can  also  bias  performance  on  some  cognitive  tasks.  In  the  case 
of  prevalence-induced  concept  change,  older  adults’  tendency  to  outsource  control  should 
increase  sensitivity  to  changes  in  the  prevalence  of  events  in  the  environment.  In  other  words, 
this  outsourcing  of  control  is  likely  to  lead  to  increased  judgement  change  and,  thus,  technically 
incorrect  responses  (judging  objectively  purple  dots  as  blue).  As  Wilson’s  (2018)  model 
highlights,  an  opponent  process  to  the  effect  of  past  response  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph 
is  the  effect  of  previous  stimuli,  such  that  people  with  a  high  value  on  this  model  weight  are 
more  likely  to  choose  the  opposite  of  the  past  stimulus  and,  thus,  demonstrate  more 
prevalence-induced  concept  change.  In  this  sense,  it  is  possible  that  older  adults’  tendency  to 
outsource  control  to  the  environment—that  is,  to  rely  more  on  cues  from  task  stimuli  instead  of 
their  own  representations  of,  say,  the  colour  blue—increases  their  sensitivity  to 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  (H2).  
Together,  these  hypotheses  paint  opposing  pictures  of  older  adults’  sensitivity  to 
prevalence-induced  concept  change.  On  the  one  hand,  H1  predicts  that  older  adults  will  respond 
more  consistently  throughout  the  whole  task  than  younger  adults  and,  as  such,  their  judgements 
will  remain  more  stable  regardless  of  changes  in  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  in  the  environment. 
H2  on  the  other  hand  predicts  that  older  adults’  judgements  will  be  more  affected  by  changes  in 
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the  prevalence  of  exemplars  due  to  a  difficulty  in  converging  on  an  accurate  representation  of  the 
concept  and,  hence,  a  tendency  to  outsource  control  to  the  environment.  
To  tease  these  hypotheses  apart,  the  current  study  will  utilize  two  experimental  paradigms 
taken  from  Levari  et  al.  (2018)  to  explore  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change  differentially 
affects  older  adults’  judgements  compared  to  younger  adults.  In  the  first,  the  Dots  Task, 
participants  judge  the  colour  of  dots  that  vary  between  blue  and  purple.  In  the  second,  the  Ethics 
Task,  participants  judge  the  ethicality  of  various  (fictitious)  research  study  proposals  that  range 
from  very  unethical  to  very  ethical.  Our  results  support  H1  by  demonstrating  that  older  adults  are 
less  sensitive  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults  in  both  tasks.  An 
exploratory  analysis  is  conducted  on  response  times  to  potentially  elucidate  the  cognitive 
mechanisms  underlying  these  differences  in  prevalence-induced  concept  changes  between 
















We  recruited  132  participants  from  the  community  and  the  university  participation  pool, 
66  of  which  were  older  adults  (60  years  and  older)  and  66  of  which  were  younger  adults 
(between  18  to  35  years).  Based  on  self-report,  all  participants  were  English-speaking,  free  of 
neurological  or  psychiatric  disorders,  and  free  of  any  cognitive,  motor,  visual,  or  other 
condition(s)  that  would  impede  their  performance,  including  but  not  limited  to  a  history  of  head 
trauma  with  loss  of  consciousness,  organic  brain  disorders,  seizures,  or  neurosurgical 
intervention,  to  sensory  deficits  (i.e.  deafness,  blindness;  intellectual  disability),  or  self-reported 
cognitive  impairment,  and  to  a  recent  history  of  substance  abuse.  Eleven  of  these  participants 
(six  older  adults,  five  younger  adults)  were  excluded  due  to  failing  the  HRR  pseudo-isochromatic 
plates  colour  vision  test  (Cole,  Lian,  &  Lakkis,  2006),  indicating  abnormal  colour-vision  which 
would  preclude  them  from  completing  the  Dots  Task  (more  details  on  the  HRR  colour  test 
below).  One  participant  was  excluded  for  failing  to  complete  both  tasks  in  the  study.  The  number 
of  excluded  participants  happened  to  be  evenly  spread  among  young  and  older  adults,  leaving  a 
final  sample  of  120  participants,  with  an  even  split  of  60  young  adults  (51  women;  M age   =  21.75; 
s age  =  2.28)  and  60  older  adults  (47  women;  M age   =  69.78;  s age  =  5.21).  The  groups  did  not 
significantly  differ  by  sex  (𝛽  =  -0.22,  SE  =  0.67,  p  =  .7389).  In  each  age  group,  participants  were 
randomly  assigned  to  either  the  decreasing  prevalence  condition  (48  women;  M age  =  45.48;  s age   = 
23.90)  or  the  stable  prevalence  condition  (49  women;  M age  =  46.05;  s age   =  24.80),  in  a 
counterbalanced  order.  Conditions  did  not  significantly  differ  in  terms  of  overall  age( F (1,  116)  = 
0.59,  p  =  0.4450),  nor  did  they  differ  between  age  within  each  age  group  (i.e.,  there  was  no 
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significant  interaction  between  age  group  and  condition  in  predicting  age;  F (1,  116)  =  1.37,  p  = 
.2240;  Stable-YA:  M age   =  21.60,  Decrease-YA:  M age   =  21.90,  Stable-OA:  M age   =  70.50, 
Decrease-OA:  M age   =  69.06).  Furthermore,  the  conditions  did  not  significantly  differ  with  regards 
to  participants’  sex,  either  across  age  groups  (𝛽  =  0.26,  SE  =  0.73,  p  =  .7182),  nor  within  age 
groups  (𝛽  =  -0.64,  SE  =  0.95,  p  =  .5036).  In  the  decreasing  prevalence  condition,  participants 
experienced  a  decreasing  prevalence  of  exemplars  in  both  tasks  detailed  below.  In  the  stable 
prevalence  condition,  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  remained  the  same  throughout  the  entire 
experiment  (see  task  descriptions  below  for  more  details).  Participants  were  either  compensated 
$20  CAD  or  2  participation  pool  credits  for  participating  in  the  study,  based  on  their  preference 
and  whether  they  were  Concordia  students.  This  study  protocol  was  approved  by  the  Concordia 
Human  Research  Ethics  Committee  (certification  number  30011191).  
Materials 
HRR  pseudo-isochromatic  test  for  colour  vision.  The  HRR  colour  vision  test  is  a  short 
screening  test  to  ensure  that  participants’  colour  vision  is  adequate  for  the  Dots  Task. 
Specifically,  this  test  was  included  to  ensure  that  participants  did  not  differ  in  how  they 
experienced  the  stimuli  in  the  Dots  Task.  
Past  work  has  demonstrated  that  certain  colour  preferences  change  as  a  result  of  healthy 
ageing  (e.g.,  older  adults  prefer  the  colour  blue  less  than  young  adults;  Dittmar,  2001). 
Furthermore,  these  changes  are  thought  to  be  attributable  to  age-related  alterations  in  colour 
discrimination.  Given  that  results  from  the  Dots  Task  assume  that  the  only  source  of  bias  in 
response  should  be  prevalence-induced,  it  was  important  to  ensure  that  all  participants  did  not 
differ  with  regards  to  their  baseline  colour  preferences.  In  practice,  given  that  many  older  adults 
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experience  sensory  deficits  that  compromise  their  ability  to  discriminate  colours  (cf.  Fiorentini, 
Porciatti,  Morrone,  &  Burr.,  1996)—which  in  turn  impact  their  colour  preferences  (Dittmar, 
2001)—this  meant  controlling  for  age-related  impairments  in  colour  discrimination  using  the 
HRR  colour  vision  test. 
The  test  contains  24  plates  (pages),  each  displaying  either  one  or  two  symbols,  which  can 
be  a  circle,  a  cross,  or  a  triangle,  four  of  which  are  demonstration  plates  to  explain  the  task  and 
six  of  which  are  screening  plates  used  to  classify  participants  based  on  their  colour  vision  (see 
Appendix  A).  The  remaining  plates  are  used  to  grade  the  severity  of  certain  deficiencies.  Only 
the  first  10  plates  were  used  in  this  study,  as  is  standard  in  assessing  basic  colour  discrimination 
(Cole,  Lian,  &  Lakkis,  2006).  The  symbols  on  each  plate  are  constructed  of  coloured  dots  that 
would  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  discern  if  someone  were  colourblind  (Cole,  Lian,  &  Lakkis, 
2006).  An  experimenter  presented  the  plates  to  participants  one  at  a  time  and  asked  them  to 
identify  how  many  symbols  they  saw,  what  the  symbols  were,  and  to  outline  those  symbols  with 
a  brush.  Participants  in  this  study  were  graded  as  pass/fail,  receiving  a  failing  grade  as  soon  as 
they  either  failed  to  identify  one  of  the  symbols  or  misidentified  a  symbol.  A  passing  grade  was 
only  given  if  all  plates  were  correctly  identified.  
It  is  worth  noting  that,  despite  the  control  in  colour  discrimination  impairments  that  the 
HRR  colour  test  affords,  there  are  still  likely  differences  in  baseline  colour  preferences  between 
young  and  old  adults.  Research  has  suggested  that  various  other  elements  than  colour 
discrimination  may  affect  age-related  colour  preferences.  For  instance,  limitations  in  visual 
imagery  abilities  in  old  age  have  been  cited  as  a  potential  contributor  to  colour  preference 
differences  between  young  and  old  adults  (Dittmar,  2001).  We  attempted  to  control  for  some  of 
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these  differences  in  our  statistical  analyses  ,  by  treating  each  participant  as  a  random  factor  (see 
Analysis  below).  Nonetheless,  it  is  likely  that  old  adults  and  young  adults  in  our  sample  may  still 
have  differed  in  their  overall  colour  preference,  which  might  have  affected  colour  judgements  in 
the  Dots  Task.  As  such,  our  results  should  be  interpreted  with  this  information  in  mind.  
The  Dots  Task.  In  the  Dots  Task,  participants  had  to  judge  the  colour  of  an  individual  dot 
presented  on  the  screen  (see  Figure  2A).  The  task  began  with  a  series  of  instruction  screens 
explaining  the  task  structure,  duration,  and  response  format  to  the  participant  (see  instructions  in 
Appendix  B).  These  instructions  were  followed  by  a  practice  block  consisting  of  10  trials,  in 
which  participants  became  familiar  with  the  task.  These  trials  were  identical  to  trials  in  the  real 
task  and  consisted  of  50%  purple  dots  and  50%  blue  dots.  Data  from  practice  trials  were  not 
analysed.  
After  the  practice  block,  participants  performed  800  test  trials  that  were  divided  into  16 
blocks  of  50  trials  each.  In  the  decreasing  prevalence  condition,  the  number  of  blue  dots  in  the 
environment  decreased  as  the  number  of  blocks  increased  in  a  predetermined  fashion  (based  on 
Levari  et  al.,  2018;  see  Figure  2A).  In  the  stable  prevalence  condition,  the  proportion  of  blue  dots 
in  the  environment  did  not  change;  it  was  always  .50.  In  both  cases,  blue  dots  were  defined  as 
any  dot  for  which  the   RGB  value  was  between  [0,  0,  254]  and  [49,  0,  205].  Purple  dots  were 
defined  as  any  dot  for  which  the  RGB  value  was  between  [50,  0,  204]  and  [99,  0,  155].  Dot 
colours  were  randomly  drawn  without  replacement  for  each  trial  based  on  the  number  of  trials 
per  block  (50)  and  the  frequency  with  which  blue  and  purple  dots  should  appear  on  a  given  block 




Figure  2 .  Task  design  for  (A)  the  Dots  Task  and  (B)  the  Ethics  Task.  
 
As  can  be  seen  in  Figure  2A,  on  each  trial,  participants  judged  just  one  of  these  dots  as 
being  either  blue  or  purple  by  pressing  the  ‘A’  or  ‘L’  key  on  the  keyboard.  All  stimuli  were 
presented  against  a  dark  grey  background.  Each  trial  went  as  follows:  A  dot  was  presented  on  the 
screen  for  500  ms,  a  question  mark  appeared  on  the  screen  until  participants  made  a  choice,  and 
a  blank  screen  appeared  for  500  ms.  Thus,  the  timing  was  fixed  across  participants,  except  that 
which  would  arise  from  differences  in  response  times.  Between  each  block,  text  appeared  that 
indicated  that  the  block  was  finished,  which  block  the  participant  was  now  at,  and  offering  them 
a  short  break  should  they  choose  to  take  one.  
The  Ethics  Task .  In  the  Ethics  Task,  participants  had  to  take  on  the  role  of  a  member  of 
an  Ethics  Review  Board  and  judge  whether  fictitious  research  proposals  were  ethical  or  not 
(phrased  as  whether  they  would  allow  these  research  studies  to  be  conducted  or  not;  see  Figure 
2B).  All  research  proposals  were  norm-tested  by  Levari  et  al.  (2018,  see  Supporting  Online 
Material)  to  produce  scores  depicting  how  ethical  people  found  the  273  proposals.  
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These  scores  were  used  to  bin  proposals  as  unethical  (80  proposals),  ethical  (113 
proposals),  or  ambiguous  (80  proposals).  These  bins  were  used  to  calculate  the  proportion  of 
proposals  that  appeared  in  each  block  (including  the  practice  trial).  
  As  in  the  Dots  Task,  participants  were  first  presented  with  instruction  screens  explaining 
the  task  to  them  (see  Appendix  C).   Following  the  instructions,  participants  completed  a  practice 
trial  in  which  they  judged  a  research  proposal  using  the  keyboard  keys.  In  this  task,  they  pressed 
‘A’  when  they  would  not  allow  a  study  to  be  conducted  and  ‘L’  when  they  would.  
All  proposals  in  the  experiment  were  presented  in  black  text  against  a  dark  grey 
background.  The  test  phase  consisted  of  240  trials  broken  into  10  blocks.  In  the  decreasing 
prevalence  condition,  the  proportion  of  unethical,  ethical,  and  ambiguous  proposals  varied  across 
blocks  (see  Figure  2B).  In  the  stable  prevalence  condition,  the  proportion  between  the  three  types 
of  proposals  was  the  same  throughout  the  task:  .33.  
Each  trial,  participants  read  a  proposal  and  pressed  ‘A’  or  ‘L’  on  the  keyboard  indicating 
whether  they  thought  that  the  research  should  be  allowed  to  take  place  or  not.  There  was  no  time 
limit  on  this  choice.  Following  the  choice,  a  fixation  cross  appeared  on  the  screen  for  500  ms, 
followed  by  the  next  proposal.  Between  each  block,  text  appeared  that  indicated  that  the  block 
was  finished,  which  block  the  participant  was  now  at,  and  offering  them  a  short  break  should 
they  choose  to  take  one.  
Both  the  Dots  and  Ethics  Tasks  described  above  were  taken  from  Levari  et  al.  (2018). 
Both  tasks  were  programmed  in  Python  using  the  PsychoPy  libraries.  Task  code  is  available 
upon  request.  
14 
Procedure 
Participants  were  recruited  from  the  community  or  from  Concordia’s  participation  pool 
(see  Appendix  D  for  examples  of  recruitment  materials).  Participants  were  contacted  by 
telephone  or  email  and  were  asked  basic  demographic  information  to  determine  initial  eligibility. 
If  eligible  at  this  stage,  they  were  invited  for  a  single  two-hour  session  in  the  lab.  
Once  at  the  lab,  participants  asked  to  fill  out  a  consent  form  (see  Appendix  E).  After 
providing  written  consent,  they  completed  the  HRR  colour  vision  test.  If  they  failed  the  colour 
vision  test,  we  still  asked  them  to  complete  the  Dots  and  Ethics  tasks,  but  we  excluded  their  data 
after  the  fact.  After  completing  the  colour  vision  test,  they  were  asked  to  complete  the  Dots  Task 
and  Ethics  Task,  back-to-back.  The  order  of  these  tasks  was  counterbalanced  across  participants. 
They  were  told  that  they  would  be  free  to  take  short  breaks  during  the  tasks  (between  blocks)  and 
a  longer  break  between  the  tasks,  should  they  choose  to.  After  completing  both  tasks, 
participants  were  debriefed  and  paid  $20  for  participating  or  were  given  their  participation 
credits.  
Analysis 
All  data  were  analysed  in  R  (version  3.6.1).  Analysis  scripts  are  available  upon  request. 
For  the  Ethics  task  specifically,  normed  scores  were  reversed,  to  be  able  to  plot  them  in  the  same 
direction  as  in  the  Dots  Task,  such  that  lower  normed  scores  represent  more  ethical  scenarios. 
Figures  were  created  using  the  ggplot2  library  (Wickham,  2016).  The  main  statistical  analyses 
consisted  of  six  general  binomial  mixed-effects  models  using  the  lme4  package  (Bates,  Maechler, 
Bolker,  &  Walker,  2015).  Models  in  each  task  predicted  response  using  age  group 
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(between-subjects;  young  adult  or  older  adult),  condition  (between-subjects;  stable  prevalence  or 
decreasing  prevalence),  trial  number  (within-subjects),  and  stimulus  strength  (within-subjects; 
colour  in  the  Dots  Task  and  normed  ethicality  scores  in  the  Ethics  Task)  as  fixed  effects,  a 
random  slope  of  trial,  and  a  random  intercept  for  each  participant.  We  considered  all  main  effects 
and  interactions.  We  then  ran  two  follow-up  models  in  both  tasks  using  the  same  predictors,  split 
by  age  group.  In  all  models,  trial  and  stimulus  strength  were  converted  to  a  scale  between  0  and 
1.  
Finally,  we  were  interested  in  exploring  how  response  times  varied  across  age  groups 
(young  vs.  old)  and  condition  (stable  vs.  decreasing).  In  line  with  best  practices  regarding 
HARKing  (Hollenback  &  Wright,  2017),  we  wish  to  disclose  that  these  analyses  were 
exploratory  and  were  not  based  on  our  original  hypotheses.  Rather  they  were  motivated  by  two 
factors:  First,  by  a  desire  to  provide  a  potential  explanation  of  the  observed  age  differences  in 
sensitivity  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change;  Second,  in  hopes  of  supplementing  the 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  literature  by  exploring  the  effect  of  condition  on  response 
times.   Accordingly,  we  analysed  response  times  using  two  between-groups  2x2  (age  group  × 
condition)  ANOVA,  one  for  each  task.  Further  work  will  be  needed  to  replicate  and  further 





Choice  Data 
In  both  tasks,  prevalence-induced  concept  change  is  reflected  as  a  three-way  interaction 
between  condition,  trial,  and  stimulus  strength,  predicting  responses.  That  is,  the  effect  size  of 
this  interaction  reflects  the  degree  to  which  a  participant’s  choice  to  categorise  a  given  exemplar 
(dot  or  research  proposal)  as  one  concept  or  another  is  influenced  by  a  combined  effect  of  three 
factors.  First,  the  changes  in  the  relative  frequency  of  a  concept  in  the  environment  (i.e.,  the 
effect  of  condition).  Second,  the  number  of  exemplars  that  the  participant  has  been  exposed  to 
(i.e.,  the  effect  of  trial).  Third,  the  strength  of  the  stimulus  (i.e.,  the  effect  of  blueness  or 
ethicality).  Thus,  if  older  and  younger  adults  differ  in  their  sensitivity  to  prevalence-induced 
concept  change,  we  would  expect  to  see  a  four-way  interaction  between  these  three  terms  above 
and  age  group  (dichotomized  as  young  adult  or  older  adult)  and  different  effect  sizes  for  this 
effect  within  each  of  the  age  groups.  
Indeed,  this  is  exactly  what  we  observe.  Results  from  the  mixed-effects  regressions  are 
represented  in  Figure  3.  In  both  tasks,  there  was  a  significant  four-way  interaction  between  age 
group,  condition,  trial,  and  stimulus  strength  (In  the  Dots  Task:  β  =  8.49,  SE  =  0.37,  p  <  .0001, 
95%  CI  =  [6.93,  10.00];  In  the  Ethics  Task:  β  =  0.90,  SE  =  0.25,  p  =  .0004,  95%  CI  =  [0.40, 
1.41]).  We  followed  up  on  these  regression  analyses  with  two  mixed-effects  regressions 
separately  for  the  two  age  groups,  using  the  same  predictors  as  above  in  both  tasks  (except  for 
age  group  of  course).  This  revealed  that  the  effect  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change—again 
represented  here  as  an  interaction  between  condition,  trial,  and  stimulus  strength—  was  much 
stronger  in  younger  adults  (β  =  25.74,  SE  =  0.90,  p  <  .0001,  95%  CI  =  [25.00,  26.40])  than  older 
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adults  (β  =  17.44,  SE  =  0.30,  p  <  .0001,  95%  CI  =  [16.90,  18.00])  in  the  Dots  Task  and  was  only 
statistically  significant  for  younger  adults  in  the  Ethics  Task  (β Young  Adults   =  1.19,  SE  =  0.22,  p  < 
.0001,  95%  CI  =  [0.76,  1.63];  β Older  Adults  =  0.21,  SE  =  0.14,  p  =  .1324,  95%  CI  =  [-0.06,  0.49]). 
Full  regression  tables  are  available  in  Appendix  F.  
Given  the  complexity  of  the  interactions  represented  in  Figure  3,  interpreting  the 
standardized  regression  weights  as  an  effect  size—that  is,  the  logged  odds  ratio  of  a 
mixed-effects,  three-  or  four-way,  interaction—would  prove  difficult  and  potentially 
uninformative.  Rather,  to  illustrate  how  prevalence  induced-concept  change  affects  judgements 
across  age  groups,  here  we  will  briefly  describe  a  section  of  our  data  in  detail.  Take  for  instance 
judgements  in  the  decreasing  prevalence  condition  for  a  dot  that  was  33%  blue.  In  the  first  200 
trials,  19%  of  young  adults  and  30%  of  older  adults  considered  this  dot  to  be  blue.  In  the  last  200 
trials  however,  73%  of  young  adults  now  considered  the  dot  to  be  blue,  whereas  only  58%  of 
older  adults  considered  the  dot  to  be  blue.  Similar  results  were  found  for  the  Ethics  Task.  For  a 
research  proposal  that  had  a  normed  rating  of  about  33%  ethical,  33%  of  young  adults  and  44% 
of  older  adults  stated  that  they  would  not  allow  this  study  to  take  place  in  the  first  48  trials.  In  the 
last  48  trials,  50%  of  younger  adults  now  would  allow  this  study  to  take  place.  This  is  in  contrast 
to  only  42%  of  older  adults  in  the  last  48  trials  who  would  allow  the  study  to  take  place;  a  small 




Figure  3.  Concept  judgements  in  (A)  the  Dots  Task  and  (B)  the  Ethics  Task.  In  the  Dots  Task,  the 
y-axis  represents  the  percent  of  dots  judged  as  blue.  In  the  Ethics  Task,  it  represents  the  percent 
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of  proposals  judged  as  unethical.  The  x-axis  represents  stimulus  strength:  blueness  in  the  Dots 
Task  and  ethicality  in  the  Ethics  task.  Points  represent  the  percent  of  choices  for  the 
corresponding  stimulus  strength,  averaged  across  subjects  within  that  cell  (e.g.,  the  percent  of 
dots  judged  as  blue  by  young  adults  in  the  stable  prevalence  condition  when  the  dot  present  on 
the  screen  was  very  blue).  Curves  represent  fitted  binomial  regression  curves.  Blue  points  and 
lines  represent  the  first  200  trials  in  the  Dots  Task  and  first  48  trials  in  the  Ethics  Task.  Red  ones 
represent  the  final  200  trials  in  the  Dots  Task  and  final  48  trials  in  the  Ethics  Task.  The  first  row 
in  both  groups  of  plots  represents  choice  data  from  young  adults  and  the  second  row  represents 
choice  data  from  older  adults.  
 
These,  admittedly  anecdotal,  examples  provide  an  expression  of  the  size  of  the  effects  in 
our  regression  results.  That  is,  they  demonstrate  that  when  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  in  the 
environment  decreases,  both  younger  and  older  adults’  concepts  expanded  to  include  exemplars 
they  previously  did  not,  but  that  this  phenomenon  occurred  to  differing  degrees  depending  on  the 
participants’  age.  
Response  Times 
Response  time  data  across  age  groups  is  presented  in  Figure  2.  Two  2x2  ANOVA  (age 
group  x  condition)  were  conducted  on  each  subject’s  mean  response  time  data  (see  the  Analysis 
section  above  for  our  rationale).  
These  analyses  revealed  a  significant  main  effect  of  age  group  on  response  time  in  both 
tasks  (Dots  Task:  F (1,  116):  51.05,  p  <  .0001,  95%  CI  =   [0.17,  0.34],  difference Older  -  Young  =  0.21 
seconds;  Ethics  Task:  F (1,  116):  23.47,  p  <  .0001,  95%  CI  =  [1.23,  4.04],  difference Older  -  Young  = 
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2.43  seconds),  but  they  did  not  indicate  a  statistically  significant  main  effect  of  condition  or 
interaction  between  age  group  or  condition  (see  Table  1).  Thus,  older  adults  responded  more 
















Figure  4 .  Pirate  plot  of  response  times  in  both  age  groups  across  both  tasks.  X-axis  is  the  age 
group.  Y-axis  is  the  mean  response  time  in  seconds  per  participant.  Each  point  represents  an 
individual  participant’s  mean  response  time.  Boxes  represent  95%  confidence  intervals  and 











Table  1 
ANOVA  Table  for  response  time  In  Dots  and  Ethics  Task 
Source SS df F p 95%  CI 
Dots  Task 
Age  Group 1.38 1 51.05 <  .0001 [0.17,   0.34] 
Condition  0.01 1 0.34 .5633 [-0.06,   0.10] 
Age  Group  * 
Condition 
0.04 1 1.63 .204 [-0.20,  0.04] 
Ethics  Task 
Age  Group 177.16 1 23.47 <  .0001 [1.23,  4.04] 
Condition  0.97 1 0.12 .7208 [-1.38,  1.43] 
Age  Group  * 
Condition 












The  purpose  of  this  thesis  was  to  investigate  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change 
differentially  affected  the  judgements  of  older  adults  across  two  conceptual  domains:  perception 
and  ethics.  We  hypothesized  that  older  adults  would  either  be  less  sensitive  (H1)  or  more 
sensitive  (H2)  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults.  Our  results  support  the 
first  hypothesis,  demonstrating  that  older  adults  were  less  sensitive  to  prevalence-induced 
concept  change  in  their  judgements  about  the  colours  of  dots  and  were  not  significantly  affected 
by  the  phenomenon  in  their  ethical  judgements  about  fictitious  research  proposals.  
These  results  dovetail  nicely  with  a  body  of  research  demonstrating  that  older  adults  have 
greater  difficulty  than  younger  adults  abandoning  past  behaviours  in  favour  of  new  behaviours 
despite  changes  in  the  environment  (Eppinger,  Hämmerer,  &  Li,  2011).  In  line  with  this  view,  as 
Wilson’s  (2018)  computational  model  (described  in  the  introduction)  highlights, 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  could  also  be  thought  of  as  a  form  of  implicit  learning, 
where  the  underlying  statistic  of  a  stimuli  (e.g.,  the  average  blueness  or  ethicality)  is  implicitly 
estimated  based  on  recently  seen  exemplars  (cf.  Cleeremans,  Destrebecqz,  &  Maud  Boyer, 
1998).  From  this  perspective,  older  adults  may  have  more  difficulty  learning  these  latent  states  of 
stimuli  and  default  to  their  original  responses  (Howard  &  Howard,  2013).  As  Nassar  and 
colleagues  (2016)  suggest,  this  difficulty  might  in  part  be  due  to  a  reduced  sensitivity  to 
uncertainty  in  the  environment.  Furthermore,  this  reduced  sensitivity  might  result  from  a  failure 
to  update  learning  without  an  explicit  environmental  cue  (e.g.,  a  surprise).  Indeed,  our  results  are 
consistent  with  this  view.  That  is,  insofar  as  prevalence-induced  concept  change  can  be  thought 
of  as  an  implicit  learning  process  (Wilson,  2018),  so  too  can  we  say  that  a  reduced  sensitivity  to 
24 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  might  result  from  a  failure  to  learn  from  an  uncertain  and 
subtly  changing  environment  (Nassar  et  al.,  2016).  
In  the  tasks  used  in  this  study,  this  same  failure  may  result  in  perseverative  behaviour 
(repeating  the  same  responses;  Burckner  et  al.,  in  prep.),  which  would  in  turn  drive 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  down,  just  as  we  see  in  our  behavioural  data.  To  examine 
whether  perseveration  is  a  driving  mechanism  behind  the  age  differences  we  observed  in  this 
study,  Wilson’s  (2018)  computational  model  could  be  applied  to  the  current  data.  In  this  model, 
two  key  parameters  of  interest  are  estimated:  the  effect  of  past  stimulus  and  the  effect  of  previous 
response  on  current  response.  Interestingly,  these  parameters  act  as  opponent  processes,  such  that 
a  greater  effect  of  past  stimuli  increases  prevalence-induced  concept,  whereas  a  greater  effect  of 
past  response  reduces  prevalence-induced  concept  change.  Thus,  based  on  past  literature  and  the 
current  behavioural  results,  we  would  expect  that  responses  from  older  adults  in  our  sample 
were,  on  average,  driven  more  by  past  response  than  younger  adults  (i.e.,  older  adults  perseverate 
more).  Indeed,  this  interpretation  would  line  up  with  neurocognitive  work,  suggesting  that 
deficient  dopaminergic  modulation  of  the  prefrontal  cortex’s  attention  regulation  mechanisms 
leads  to  less  distinctive  mental  representations  among  older  adults  (Li,  Lindenberger,  & 
Sikström,  2001).  This  would  further  imply  that  as  people  age,  their  representations  of  past 
stimuli  become  weaker  and  less  specific.  Thus,  due  to  this  dysregulation  of  dopamine  pathways, 
older  adults  may  rely  less  on  their  (impoverished)  representation  of  past  stimuli  and  instead  rely 
more  readily  on  their  previous  responses  (i.e.,  engage  in  perseverative  behaviour;  Eppinger,  et 
al.,  2013;  de  Boer  et  al.,  2017).  
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  If  perseveration  is  the(/a)  mechanism  underlying  older  adults’  reduced  sensitivity  to  the 
phenomenon  however,  it  would  be  rather  interesting  that  a  feature  of  healthy  ageing  generally 
regarded  as  maladaptive—a  difficulty  in  adapting  behaviour  to  changing  and  uncertain 
conditions;  deficient  dopamine  modulation—would  in  this  case  be  protective  against  some  of  the 
more  problematic  effects  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change  in  the  real-world.  Take,  for 
instance,  some  ethical  judgements,  where  one  might  argue  that  judgements  ought  to  remain 
relatively  stable  over  time.  
However,  there  is  an  alternative  explanation  as  to  why  we  observe  differences  between 
younger  and  older  adults  in  the  current  sample  that  needs  to  be  considered:  Beyond  just 
perseveration,  older  adults’  longer  response  times  themselves  might  also  have  contributed—or 
been  the  result  of  some  other  process  that  contributed—to  reduced  prevalence-induced  concept 
change.  At  the  end  of  his  paper,  Wilson  (2018)  briefly  remarked  that  the  smallest  behavioural 
effects  in  Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  original  data  were  observed  in  the  Ethics  Task,  which  also  had  the 
longest  response  times.  These  differences  in  response  time  inadvertently  increased  the  amount  of 
time  between  stimuli  across  the  tasks  (approximately  850  ms  between  dots  in  Study  1-5  and  5  s 
between  research  proposals  in  Study  7).  Our  results  replicate  this  finding  in  the  young  adults, 
such  that  young  adults  showed  reduced  prevalence-induced  concept  change  in  the  Ethics  Task 
compared  to  the  Dots  Task.  Furthermore,  we  also  found  an  even  smaller  effect  of 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  (or  complete  lack  of  one  in  the  Ethics  Task)  in  older  adults, 
who  also  showed  even  longer  response  times  across  both  tasks  (see  Figure  3).  Thus,  the  question 
arises:  Are  the  effects  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change  observed  in  these  tasks  affected  by 
the  speed  at  which  responses  are  made?  
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The  observed  differences  in  response  times  between  younger  and  older  adults  can  be 
explained  by  two  different  (but  not  mutually  exclusive)  hypotheses,  which  in  turn  might 
elucidate  the  mechanisms  underlying  the  differences  in  sensitivity  to  prevalence-induced  concept 
change.  First,  older  adults  in  our  sample  might  be  exhibiting  general  slowing,  a  well-known 
cognitive  phenomenon  in  healthy  ageing  whereby  peoples’  response  times  slow  with  age 
(Verhaeghen  &  Cerella,  2002).  If  this  were  the  case,  slower  responses  among  older  adults  in  our 
sample  would  simply  be  demonstrating  a  basic  feature  of  healthy  ageing.  Furthermore,  if 
differences  in  sensitivity  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  are  in  part  due  to  general 
slowing,  it  might  suggest  that  the  paradigms  we  used  are  very  sensitive  to  differences  in  timing 
between  the  stimuli.  If  so,  it  would  be  important  to  re-evaluate  to  what  degree 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  is  task-dependent  and  if  there  were  ways  to  measure  it 
independently  of  response  time.  
However,  a  second  explanation  as  to  why  older  adults  differ  in  terms  of  response  time 
from  younger  adults  might  be  that  they  engage  in  a  speed-accuracy  trade-off  (Starns  &   Ratcliffe, 
2012;  Salthouse,  1979).  From  this  perspective,  it  would  not  necessarily  be  the  case  that  older 
adults  are  limited  in  their  ability  to  respond  quickly  per  se,  but  rather  prioritise  accuracy  over 
response  speed.  Thus,  in  the  context  of  our  tasks,  older  adults  would  spend  more  time  judging 
each  exemplar  to  attempt  to  maximise  “accuracy”  (or  perhaps  something  like  internal 
consistency  in  the  case  of  the  Ethics  Task).  Were  this  the  case,  it  would  suggest  that  the  effects  of 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  might  be  resisted  if  one  put  effort  into  slow,  deliberate,  and 
accurate  response  (cf.  Kahneman’s  (2011)  System  2  thinking).  Furthermore,  it  would  open  up  the 
possibility  that  the  effects  elicited  by  current  tasks  used  to  measure  prevalence-induced  concept 
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change  are  not  necessarily  sensitive  to  increased  response  time  in  and  of  itself  (i.e.,  greater 
distance  between  stimuli)  but  rather  to  different  decision-making  strategies  altogether,  such  as 
those  that  trade  speed  for  accuracy.  
Exploring  which  of  these  interpretations  are  borne  out  by  future  data  is  important  not 
only  for  elucidating  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change  differentially  affects  younger  and 
older  adults’  judgements,  but  it  is  also  crucial  for  better  understanding  how  it  plays  out  in  the 
real-world.  This  is  because  real-world  judgements  are  often  made  on  “stimuli”  that  are  hours, 
days,  or  months  apart  in  time  and,  even  when  judgements  are  made  on  “stimuli”  that  are  close  in 
time,  people  may  have  motivation  to  weigh  their  choices  carefully  and  deliberately  (e.g.,  in 
political  discussions).  As  such,  it  is  important  to  verify  how  robust  the  observed  lab  effects  are  to 
differences  in  timing  between  stimuli  and  response  strategies  should  we  wish  to  generalise  from 
the  lab  to  real-world  decision-making  (cf.  Yarkoni,  2019).  
Furthermore,  this  future  research  has  substantial  implications  for  prevalence-induced 
concept  change  as  a  phenomenon  more  broadly.  Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  initial  interpretation  of 
their  results  was  that  prevalence-induced  concept  change,  as  the  name  suggests,  affects  concepts 
themselves .  While  the  authors  provide  this  phenomenon  with  a  new  name,  prevalence-induced 
concept  change  can  be  accounted  for  by  an  older  theory  in  cognitive  psychology:  the  prototype 
theory  of  concepts  (e.g.,  Homa,  Rhoads,  &  Chambliss,  1979;  Rosch  &  Mervis,  1975).  According 
to  this  theory  stimuli  are  categorised  by  referring  to  an  abstracted  mental  prototype  of  a  concept 
(e.g.,  a  labrador  may  stand  in  for  a  prototype  to  the  concept  “dog”).  These  prototypes  are  then 
themselves  susceptible  to  update  from  environmental  information,  such  as,  in  this  case,  the 
prevalence  (Smith  &  Minda,  1998;  Minda  &  Smith,  2001).  Prototype  theory,  however,  runs  into 
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issues,  particularly  in  how  it  is  usually  supported  empirically;  that  is  through  categorisation 
tasks.  As  Magolis  (1994)  points  out,  it  is  very  difficult  to  determine  if  such  tasks  truly  tap  into 
people’s  concepts  (their  representations)  or  merely  describe  how  they  make  judgements  about 
concepts  (their  behaviour).  In  the  case  of  prevalence-induced  concept  change,  if  it  is  the  latter, 
then  it  is  dubious  to  call  the  phenomenon  “concept”  change,  when  really  what  is  changing  as  the 
prevalence  of  exemplars  decrease  is  the  criterion  people  use  for  categorising  certain  stimuli.  For 
instance,  past  work  using  similar  linguistic  binary  categorisation  tasks—categorising  stimuli  as  a 
“word”  or  “non-word”—has  revealed  that  when  the  proportion  of  exemplars  is  asymmetrical 
(more  non-words  than  words),  error  rates  increase  (Wagenmakers  et  al.,  2008).  From  the 
interpretation  Levari  et  al.  (2018)  offer,  this  would  suggest  that  the  “concept”  of  “word”  has 
changed  due  to  this  asymmetry,  since  participants  become  more  likely  to  judge  words  as 
non-words  (i.e.,  they  are  making  more  errors).  This,  of  course,  would  be  a  nonsensical 
explanation  of  these  data.  For  similar  reasons,  Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  original  interpretation  that 
concepts  themselves  change  alongside  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  may  not  be  warranted.  In 
other  words,  with  current  methods  for  measuring  prevalence-induced  concept  change  in  the  lab, 
it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  between  concept  change  and  task-dependent  response  bias.  
However,  another,  albeit  less  grandiose,  interpretation  of  the  current  findings  (and 
Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  findings  for  that  matter)  is  that  concepts  remain  stable,  but  judgements 
about  concepts  change  as  the  prevalence  of  exemplars  of  a  concept  shifts.  That  is,  our  concept  of 
blue  might  remain  stable  despite  changes  in  the  environment,  but  whether  and  how  we  decide  to 
apply  that  concept  to  a  stimulus  might  change.  If  this  were  the  case,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  decision-making  strategies  like  a  speed-accuracy  trade-off  may  affect  such  decisions. 
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However,  it  is  less  intuitive  to  suggest  that—presumably  deliberate—strategies  like  this  affect 
the  content  of  our  basic  conceptual  apparatuses,  as  Levari’s  et  al.  (2018)  interpretation  could 
suggest.  Moreover,  this  interpretation  may  allow  for  a  lower-level  understanding  of 
prevalence-induced  concept  change,  as  a  cognitive  phenomenon  that  affects  humans’  criteria  for 
making  judgements  rather  than  one  that  changes  higher-order  concepts  themselves.  Therefore, 
elucidating  whether  prevalence-induced  concept  change  is  affected  by  explicit  decision-making 
strategies  has  not  only  important  implications  for  understanding  how  the  phenomenon  affects 
older  adults,  but  also  for  properly  understanding  what  is  meant  by  prevalence-induced  concept 
change  to  begin  with.  
In  summary,  the  current  results  suggest  that  older  adults  are  less  sensitive  to 
prevalence-induced  concept  change  than  younger  adults.  The  potential  real-world  implication  of 
these  findings  are  context-dependent,  such  that  in  some  cases  it  can  be  adaptive  for  one’s 
judgments  to  be  sensitive  to  a  changing  world,  however  in  others  it  can  be  harmful.  For  instance, 
when  fresh  fruits  are  not  available  in  supermarkets,  it  is  adaptive  for  customers  to  adjust  their 
judgements  of  “fresh”  to  include  foods  that  they  might  otherwise  exclude.  However,  in  moral 
and  social  decisions,  it  may  be  beneficial  to  hold  our  judgements  to  a  higher  ideal  rather  than 
shift  them  alongside  changing  trends.  As  such,  the  fact  that  older  adults  demonstrate  less 
sensitivity  to  prevalence-induced  concept  change  can  be  a  benefit  in  some  situations  and  more 
problematic  in  others.  
To  further  explore  how  prevalence-induced  concept  change  affects  judgements,  both  in 
old  age  and  in  general,  we  present  three  avenues  for  future  research:  (a)  the  implementation  of 
Wilson’s  (2018)  computational  model  to  better  understand  how  age  differences  in  sensitivity  to 
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prevalence-induced  concept  change  arise  as  a  result  of  sequential  choice  effects  such  as 
perseveration;  (b)  further  exploration  of  the  degree  to  which  prevalence-induced  concept  change 
is  sensitive  to  the  timing  between  stimuli;  and  (c)  investigating  whether  longer  response  times 
among  older  adults  in  these  tasks  are  due  to  general  slowing,  a  speed-accuracy  trade-off,  or  a 
combination  of  both.  
Though  much  more  work  needs  to  be  done,  the  current  study  points  to  the  fact  that  as  we 
age,  how  we  make  judgements  from  our  concepts  might  become  more  rigid  as  we  face  a 
changing  world.  This  notion  is  important  when  considering  the  degree  to  which  older  adults’  use 
of  concepts,  such  as  right,  fair,  free,  and  so  on  will  come  to  affect  the  future  direction  of  our 
society.  Indeed,  as  we  age,  it  seems  that  our  judgements  about  concepts  remain  more  stable,  even 
if  the  world  around  us  presents  us  with  continued  reason  to  change  them.  It  is  in  this  sense  that 
the  quote  at  the  beginning  of  this  thesis  earns  its  relevance:  The  more  things  (our  age  and  our 
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Appendix  A  
Example  of  HRR  Colour  Vision  Test  Plate 
 
Figure  1 .  Example  of  a  colour  plate  in  the  HRR  Colour  Vision  Test.  Taken  from  Cole,  Lian,  and 










Appendix  B  
Instructions  for  the  Dots  Task  
Welcome  to  this  study!  We’re  interested  in  studying  how  people  perceive  and  identify  colors. 
In  this  task,  you  will  see  dots  presented  on  the  screen  one  at  a  time,  in  a  variety  of  colors.  Your 
task  in  this  study  will  be  to  identify  blue  dots. 
When  you  see  a  blue  dot  on  the  screen,  press  the  “A”  key.  For  all  other  dots,  press  the  “L”  key. 
The  dots  will  be  presented  in  series  with  breaks  in  between.  This  means  that  you  will  see  a  series 
of  dots,  have  a  short  break,  and  then  another  series  of  dots,  until  you  have  seen  20  series. 
Some  of  the  series  you  see  may  have  a  lot  of  blue  dots,  and  others  may  have  only  a  few.  There’s 
nothing  for  you  to  count  or  keep  track  of  --  your  only  task  is  to  identify  blue  dots. 
You  should  do  your  best  to  answer  quickly  and  accurately  during  the  study.  However,  if  you 
make  a  mistake  and  hit  the  wrong  button  at  any  point,  just  keep  going. 
Now  you  will  complete  a  brief  practice  series  so  you  can  get  used  to  the  task. 
You  have  now  completed  the  practice  series.  If  you  have  any  questions,  you  can  ask  the 
experimenter  now. 
Otherwise,  you're  ready  to  begin  the  study. 
 
After  each  block: 
Series  complete. 







Appendix  C 
Instructions  for  the  Ethics  Task  
Welcome  to  this  study!  We’re  interested  in  studying  how  people  make  ethical  decisions  about 
scientific  experiments. 
Many  scientific  experiments  involve  some  risk  for  the  participants  because  they  can  cause 
psychological  distress  or  physical  harm.  Universities  have  to  make  difficult  ethical  decisions 
about  whether  or  not  to  allow  experiments  to  be  conducted. 
Today,  you  will  read  about  various  experiments  that  could  be  conducted  on  human  beings.  We 
simply  want  to  know  whether  you  think  scientists  SHOULD  or  SHOULD  NOT  be  allowed  to 
conduct  each  of  these  experiments. 
Because  this  is  an  ethical  decision,  there  are  no  right  or  wrong  answers.  We  simply  want  your 
personal  decision  for  each  study. 
Here  are  some  things  to  keep  in  mind  as  you  make  your  decisions. 
1)  All  of  the  experiments  you  will  read  about  will  be  conducted  on  adults  who  have  volunteered 
to  take  part  in  exchange  for  money. 
2)  All  of  the  experiments  are  part  of  research  on  human  behavior. 
3)  When  scientists  must  lie  to  the  participants  either  before  or  during  the  experiment,  they  always 
tell  the  participants  the  truth  when  the  experiment  is  over. 
4)  Participants  are  always  free  to  withdraw  and  can  stop  participating  at  any  time  they  wish. 
In  the  task,  you  will  see  descriptions  of  experiments  presented  on  the  screen,  one  at  a  time. 
When  you  read  a  description  of  an  experiment  that  you  would  not  allow  to  be  conducted,  press 
the  "A"  key.  For  all  other  experiments,  press  the  "L"  key. 
The  experiments  will  be  presented  in  series,  with  breaks  in  between.  This  means  that  you  will 
read  a  series  of  experiments,  have  a  short  break,  and  then  another  series  of  experiments,  until  you 
have  seen  10  series. 
Some  of  the  series  you  see  may  have  a  lot  of  unethical  experiments,  and  others  may  have  only  a 
few.  There’s  nothing  for  you  to  count  or  keep  track  of  --  your  only  task  is  to  approve  or  reject 
each  experiment. 
You  should  do  your  best  to  answer  quickly  and  accurately  during  the  study.  However,  if  you 
make  a  mistake  and  hit  the  wrong  button  at  any  point,  just  keep  going. 
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Now  you  will  complete  a  brief  practice  round  so  you  can  get  used  to  the  task. 
You  have  now  completed  the  practice  round.  If  you  have  any  questions,  you  can  ask  the 
experimenter  now.  Otherwise,  you're  ready  to  begin  the  study. 
After  each  block: 
Series  complete.  


















Appendix  D 
Recruitment  Materials  
 



















Appendix  E 
Consent  Form  
INFORMATION  AND  CONSENT  FORM 
Study  Title:  Prevalence-induced  Concept  Change  in  Older  Adults 
Researcher(s):  Dr.  Ben  Eppinger;  Sean  Devine 
Researchers’  Contact  Information:  Dept.  of  Psychology,  Concordia  University  7141 
Sherbrooke  St.  Ouest,  Montréal,  H4B  1R6  (514-848-2424  x2397;  ben.eppinger@concordia.ca ). 
Faculty  Supervisor:  Dr.  Ben  Eppinger 
Faculty  Supervisor’s  Contact  Information:  514-848-2424  x2397;  ben.eppinger@concordia.ca 
Source  of  funding  for  the  study:  CIHR  MC001-2017:  CRC  in  cognitive  neuroscience  of 
decision-making  in  healthy  human  aging. 
You  are  being  invited  to  participate  in  the  research  study  mentioned  above.  This  form  provides 
information  about  what  participating  would  mean.  Please  read  it  carefully  before  deciding  if  you 
want  to  participate  or  not.  If  there  is  anything  you  do  not  understand,  or  if  you  want  more 
information,  please  ask  the  researcher. 
A.  PURPOSE 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  how  younger  and  older  adults  make  decisions  about 
categories. 
B.  PROCEDURES 
If  you  participate,  you  will  be  asked  to  complete  a  demographic  questionnaire,  as  well  as  several 
computerized  tasks.  The  whole  session  should  take  about  2  hours  and  will  require  you  to 
complete  various  tasks  on  a  computer  in  the  lab. 
C.  RISKS  AND  BENEFITS 
There  are  no  direct  advantages  for  participation  in  this  study,  and  this  research  is  not  intended  to 
benefit  you  personally. 
The  principal  disadvantage  of  participating  in  this  study  is  the  time  it  will  take  you  to  participate 
in  the  testing  session.  There  is  a  slight  risk  that  you  might  feel  a  loss  of  confidence  in  your  ability 
to  perform  tests  of  cognitive  skill,  because  of  the  perception  that  you  did  not  perform  as  well  as 
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you  expected.  Importantly,  each  of  the  tests  are  calibrated  to  be  at  a  suitable  level  of  difficulty  for 
individuals  in  your  age  group.  If  you  wish  to  discuss  any  concerns,  you  may  contact  Dr.  Ben 
Eppinger  PhD,  the  research  project  leader  (514-848-2424  ext.  2397),  who  can  provide  advice 
concerning  follow-up  consultation  with  your  family  physician. 
D.  CONFIDENTIALITY 
We  will  gather  the  following  information  as  part  of  this  research: 
● Demographic  information  (including  information  on  your  history,  background,  and  any 
physical  or  cognitive  problems  you  may  have). 
● Computer-based  tasks  aimed  at  examining  your  judgment  about  categories. 
We  will  not  allow  anyone  to  access  the  information,  except  people  directly  involved  in 
conducting  the  research.  We  will  only  use  the  information  for  the  purposes  of  the  research 
described  in  this  form.  The  information  gathered  will  be  coded.  That  means  that  the  information 
will  be  identified  by  a  code.  The  researcher  will  have  a  list  that  links  the  code  to  your  name.  We 
will  protect  the  information  by  storing  it  in  a  locked  and  secure  location  at  Concordia  University, 
and  in  the  case  of  digital  information,  in  a  password  protected  file  on  a  secure  server.  We  intend 
to  publish  the  results  of  the  research.  However,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  identify  you  in  the 
published  results.  We  will  destroy  the  information  five  years  after  the  end  of  the  study. 
F.  CONDITIONS  OF  PARTICIPATION 
You  do  not  have  to  participate  in  this  research.  It  is  purely  your  decision.  If  you  do  participate, 
you  can  stop  at  any  time.  You  can  also  ask  that  the  information  you  provided  not  be  used,  and 
your  choice  will  be  respected.  If  you  decide  that  you  don’t  want  us  to  use  your  information,  you 
must  tell  the  researcher  before  leaving  the  testing  session. 
Participants  will  receive  a  compensation  of  $10.00  per  hour.  If  you  withdraw  before  the  end  of 
the  research,  you  will  receive  $10.00. 
To  make  sure  that  research  money  is  being  spent  properly,  auditors  from  Concordia  or  outside 






Appendix  F 
Mixed-Effects  Regression  Tables  
Table  1 
Output  from  overall  mixed-effects  regression  in  The  Dots  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -5.72 0.15 <  .0001 
Age  Group 1.74 0.22 <  .0001 
Condition 1.16 0.18 <  .0001 
Trial -1.06 0.24 <  .0001 
Colour 15.15 0.15 <  .0001 
Age  Group  * 
Condition 
-2.07 0.27 <  .0001 
Age  Group  *  Trial 1.06 0.52 .0400 
Age  Group  *  Colour -5.41 0.20 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial -2.64 0.30 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Colour -4.41 0.18 <  .0001 
Trial  *  Colour 0.53 0.19 .0060 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  *  Trial 
-2.30 0.71 .0012 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  *  Colour 
5.21 0.27 <  .0001 
Age  Group  *  Trial  * 
Colour 
-0.50 0.29 .0832 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Colour 
17.43 0.22 <  .0001 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Colour 
8.48 0.37 <  .0001 
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Table  2 
Output  from  mixed-effects  regression  for  young  adults  only,  in  the  Dots  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -3.98 0.18 <  .0001 
Condition -0.91 0.25 .0002 
Trial 0.001 0.25 .9937 
Colour 9.74 0.20 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial -4.89 0.34 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Colour 0.82 0.31 .0008 
Trial  *  Colour 0.01 0.36 0.9678 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Colour 
25.74 0.90 <  .0001 
 
Table  3 
Output  from  mixed-effects  regression  for  older  adults  only,  in  the  Dots  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -5.72 0.19 <  .0001 
Condition 1.17 0.23 <  .0001 
Trial -1.10 0.22 <  .0001 
Colour 15.15 0.26 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial -2.63 0.26 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Colour -4.42 0.34 <  .0001 
Trial  *  Colour 0.61 0.28 .0285 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Colour 
17.44 0.30 <  .0001 
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Table  4 
Output  from  overall  mixed-effects  regression  in  The  Ethics  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -2.61 0.24 <   .0001 
Age  Group -0.60 0.34 .0798 
Condition 0.21 0.35 .5478 
Trial -0.87 0.47 .0617 
Ethicality 0.75 0.05 <  .0001 
Age  Group  * 
Condition 
-2.05 0.55 .0002 
Age  Group  *  Trial -0.25 0.68 .7163 
Age  Group  * 
Ethicality 
0.20 0.07 .0043 
Condition  *  Trial -0.52 0.75 .4864 
Condition  * 
Ethicality 
-0.03 0.07 .6470 
Trial  *  Ethicality  0.18 0.08 .0308 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  *  Trial 
-4.69 1.23 .0001 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  * 
Ethicality  
0.60 0.12 <  .0001 
Age  Group  *  Trial  * 
Ethicality 
0.25 0.13 .0450 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Ethicality 
0.25 0.14 .0700 
Age  Group  * 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Ethicality 
0.90 0.25 .0004 
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Table  5 
Output  from  mixed-effects  regression  for  younger  adults  only,  in  the  Ethics  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -3.28 0.27 <  .0001 
Condition -1.79 0.45 <  .0001 
Trial -1.02 0.59 .0835 
Ethicality 0.96 0.05 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial -5.53 1.10 <  .0001 
Condition  * 
Ethicality 
0.56 0.10 <  .0001 
Trial  *  Ethicality 0.43 0.10 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Ethicality 
1.19 0.22 <  .0001 
 
Table  6 
Output  from  mixed-effects  regression  for  older  adults  only,  in  the  Ethics  Task 
Source Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -2.58 0.23 <  .0001 
Condition 0.14 0.33 .6624 
Trial -0.93 0.40 .0221 
Ethicality 0.74 0.05 <  .0001 
Condition  *  Trial -0.37 0.68 .5859 
Condition  *  Ethicality -0.01 0.07 .8406 
Trial  *  Ethicality 0.19 0.08 .0197 
Condition  *  Trial  * 
Ethicality 
0.21 0.14 0.1324 
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